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If we examine this fact of transition 
more closely ... we must here banish 
from our minds the prejudice in favor 
of duration, as if it had any advantage 
as compared with transience: the im-
perishable mountains are not superior 
to the quickly dismantled rose exhaling 
its life in fragrance.
G. W. F. Hegel1
Historical transition is a conceptual topos 
necessarily linked, dialectically or linearly, 
to the problem of historical continuity; it has 
posed a vexed contradiction for historio-
graphical and philosophical analysis since 
at least the time of Hegel. Yet, as Hegel well 
understood, these were not “merely” histori-
cal problems; rather, and more importantly, 
they were problems tied to a critique of the 
present. Indeed, while he seems to validate 
transience over duration in the “Oriental 
World” section of his Lectures on the Philoso-
phy of History – recall his insistence that the 
“eternal standstill” of the Orient was its fatal 
flaw – nevertheless, his general insistence 
on a methodologically necessary historical 
totalization complicates this picture. For, as 
Peter Osborne has pointed out, Hegelian to-
talization merely displaces the meaning of 
temporality to the other.2 Apparently shifting 
the burden of continuous Time to the Orient 
and preserving transient or transitional Time 
for the Western/German world, Hegel effec-
tively smuggled atemporality back into his 
philosophical method. To the extent, then, 
that ‘continuity’ and ‘transition’ have subse-
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quently become popular concepts of historical analysis – and they have been subjects of a great 
revival in the past decade or so – they have become so by being transformed into what Hegel called 
“bad infinities”: that is, they have expanded to unmanageable levels of abstraction by representing 
ostensibly depoliticized truth-claims on historical and present reality.
Following a Weberianized version of Hegel in China studies – a version that was simplified 
through the Parsonian appropriation of Weber as a theorist of capitalist modernization – an old 
answer to the ostensible conundrum presented by transition and continuity in Chinese history 
was to deny that there was one. That is, historical questions were posed so as to preclude 
contradiction, and China’s long-lived imperial political, economic and cultural formations were 
accordingly seen as enduringly stable as well as impervious to a transition to the modern. This, 
after all, is the central message of Weber’s nineteen-twenties study, Religion of China, and, dif-
ferently, in Hegel’s vision, where perdurable historicity – transience or transition – was simply 
not within the purview of the empire’s durational expanse. In recent decades, however, while 
the old stagnation theory of Chinese history originally derived from Hegel and Weber has been 
thoroughly rejected, historical questions continue to be framed within the paradigm of continuity 
and transition, albeit now posed so as to encompass the possibility of change. Thus, solutions 
to the question of China’s imperial longevity have been found in such formulations as: for the 
economy, “involutionary change”,3 “change without development”,4 or, the oscillating ascendance 
of two primary modes of production with no one mode dominant;5 for the apparent persistence 
of gender formations from the Song through the Qing dynasty, “resilience”;6 or, for metacultural 
continuity, a congenial reformulation of the stagnant “Confucian civilization” thesis into a theory 
of dynamic Confucian capitalism; and so on. What distinguishes all of these recent attempts at 
exploring the old problem from new angles and evidence is their renewed reliance upon reified 
concepts of “culture”, albeit now valuated positively rather than negatively.
In this light and at a minimum level, it can be said that all of these formulations grapple with 
genuine issues; that is, the issues are genuine in the sense of being seen as problems requiring 
historical explication. Yet, by the same token, such problems can only be seen as genuine if trans-
formed into historical problematics, understood in the sense of the Lukácsian ideological real: that 
is, as an historically necessary reification that corresponds to and articulates a particular historical 
moment. The ideologically real, on this view, is a category of modern social life internal to the con-
stitution of that social life, and not a function of an extrinsic imposition.7 In this sense, one can view 
the Hegelian philosophical problematic of transience/duration, or transition/continuity, as well 
as the importance accorded to “culture” in Hegel and today, as significant in the China field today.8 
Thus, rather than a timeless and enduring problem of Chinese history (as Weber and Hegel both 
presented it), transience/duration is a fundamental political problem of modern and contemporary 
social life and thought; its renewed currency in China studies today must be viewed in that light. 
This is quite evident in the strong resurgence staged by the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP) 
in nineteen-eighties Chinese historical analysis after more than a half-century in eclipse. Surely 
one of the most reified of all historical concepts, the AMP’s comeback emerged not as part of 
a general rethinking of Marxist modes of production, but rather as part of a re-interpretation 
of Chinese history and a re-orientation of Chinese historiography in the post-Mao period. This 
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resurgence – anachronistic as it may seem in both national Chinese and global terms – presents 
a good opportunity to explore some of the ways in which historiography in China dovetails with 
and reinforces some prominent strands of American academic production in the China field and 
in general; it helps point to the global process of what Timothy Bewes calls the “ideological cor-
rosion of the possibility of anything other than what exists”.9 It is the investigation of this process 
of reification that concerns this essay.
Good-bye to Revolution10
Ever since the late nineteen-twenties/early nineteen-thirties debates over the AMP in the Soviet 
Union and China, among other locations, the stigmatized multilinearity inherent in this theory 
of divergent historical paths had been rejected for a unilinear historicist dogmatism. Now, 
multilinearity has become quite attractive, not only in China but in postcolonial theory as well 
as among economic historians of China in the United States. In the nineteen thirties, moreover, 
the AMP’s basic coordinates – despotic state dominating and appropriating surplus from self-
sufficient, classless village communities – did not answer the needs of the past as it appeared in 
China’s revolutionary present. While the AMP resurfaced from time to time in China and, implicitly 
or explicitly, in Cold War histories in the US – particularly in the nineteen fifties and early nineteen 
sixties to claim that Asiatic despotism was alive and well in Soviet and Chinese bureaucratism 
– nevertheless, in serious analyses in and of China, the AMP was abandoned as an impossible 
historical and historiographical obstacle to understanding the violent transformations of modern 
Chinese society and the world, even as some of its legacies remained untouched. Now, all over 
the world, the present is decidedly post- or even anti-revolutionary; stability has become the positive 
watchword for all cheerleaders of foreign investment and economic growth and development. Con-
sequently, in most scholarship, social conflict in the guise of class analysis and struggle has become 
anathema. Finally, skepticism about the AMP in the nineteen twenties and nineteen thirties was 
also powerfully informed by the observed correlation between AMP theory and imperialism, both 
as a chronological coincident (the theory rose just as modern imperialism waxed strong) and as 
an apologetic. In the latter idiom, China’s supposed AMP-induced stagnation became an apology 
for the Japanese invasion of and modernizing mission in China;11 more generally, the AMP’s em-
phasis on socio-economic stasis was seen as but an imperialist rationale, not only in relation to 
China, but in relation to Egypt, India, and other colonies as well.12 However, now that economistic 
modernization is all the rage, parading under the guise of globalization as a positive good, im-
perialism, however deplored politically and culturally in China and elsewhere, is often favorably 
associated with examples of successful post-War economic progress: in East Asia, particularly 
with the progress shown by the ex-Japanese colonies, Taiwan and South Korea. Thus, the waning 
of revolutionary historical paradigms; the rise of more nationalistic modernizationist ones after 
Mao Zedong’s death (1976); and the re-orientation of Chinese socio-economics in the nineteen 
eighties curiously facilitated the return of the AMP to historiographical attention.
In this general light, the global realignments of the nineteen nineties and the consequent recent 
resurgence of what might be called ‘transitology’ in contemporary Chinese (and Russian) socio-
economic and political commentary has pulled attention back to the problem of transience/
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continuity, albeit in a decidedly unrevolutionary idiom. Clearly, this problem was never totally 
absent from scholarship, as the concepts of “convergence,” “belatedness”, or “take-off” central to 
modernization theory might remind us. However, the problem has been reborn theoretically in a 
slightly different form and register: as a debate over the problem of the multilinearity of histori-
cal paths, or, in the language of postcolonial theory, as a problem of “alternative modernities”. 
In this perspective, many of the older articulations of this problem – the problem of the AMP for 
example – can be said to be hackneyed or out-of-date. Yet, from another perspective, many of the 
issues foregrounded in those older controversies remain at the center of intellectual, policy, and 
historiographical contention precisely because they reflect and respond to, while simultaneously 
articulating, the problematics of global capitalism at various moments of its local instantiations. 
The recent controversy in the Journal of Asian Studies (2002), which pits economic historians of 
China, Philip Huang and Kenneth Pomeranz, against one another, underlines the AMP’s continued 
spectral presence in the China field – a spectrality that derives from the continuing centrality of 
Weberian problem-consciousness; this continuity demonstrates, in fact, how inadequate the 
questions posed continue to be for the transformation of the dominant historical problematics 
(none of the recent debaters in the China field acknowledge either their own historicity or the 
ghostly presence of the AMP or Weber in their work).13
It is, then, in the sense of the ideological real – reification – as a particular form of historicity that 
the “missing link” as a fundamental historical and ideological gap – or, to give it a philosophical 
name, aporia – becomes interesting. The “missing link” could refer in a very specific sense to the 
theory, initially popularized in 1931 by the Soviet economic theorist, Mikhail Ia. Godes, that Marx, in 
his inclusion of the AMP in the sequence of universal historical stages in the preface to A Contribu-
tion to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), was merely providing, in the absence of adequate 
research, a “missing link” to the development of private property in pre-capitalist societies.14 Godes’ 
“missing link” theory further held that, once empirical research had demonstrated the invalidity 
of the AMP (by the eighteen seventies), Marx, but mostly Engels, abandoned the category; this led 
Godes to conclude that the AMP was not legitimate as a fully mature Marxist historical category. As 
is well known, the late nineteen-twenties/early nineteen-thirties debates surrounding the AMP, 
of which Godes’ theory was a major part, soon led to its elimination from the Stalinist codifica-
tion of the five-stage theory of universal historical progression and a consequent insistence on 
the unilinearity of all histories.15 
Not being under the same strictures as Godes and his mostly unfortunate comrades in the Soviet 
debates, we can note that, in a more general sense, the “missing link” concept articulates an 
unstated but implicit centrality of an a priori temporally conceived spatial boundedness, most 
easily captured in the ideology of the nation-state, an entity extrinsically and ahistorically linked 
to a pre-existing global universal time-space (whether of competiting nation-states, in the clas-
sical theories of international relations; or of capital, in Marxian and non-Marxian theories of 
development; or, yet again, of Weberian modernization and Hegelian Geist). Here, the point is to 
note the peculiarly and particuliarly unmarked and yet crucial missed historiographical linking 
of “modes of production” to nation-time (diachronic chronology) and nation-spaces (geographic 
unity) by the nineteen twenties. Indeed, as Anne Bailey and Josep R. Llobera wrote some years 
ago: “The ‘nationalization’ of revolution [with 1917] had its parallel in the ‘nationalization’ of evolu-
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 07/06/2020 15:46:06 |
62
The Asiatic Mode of Production HISTOREIN
V
O
L
U
M
E
 5 (2005)
63
tion, whereby the history of nations was interpreted as a succession of modes of production.”16 
And, they add, “The merging of world history and national histories as a sequence of universal 
stages is perhaps partly a product of the nationalization of revolution.”17
It is in the realm of this merging, or conflation, that the peculiar contemporary appeal of multi-
linearity appears as a reified meta-historical truism and even compensatory gesture in this era 
of global capital. As with the missing link between evolutionary modes of production and the 
nation-state for previous Marxist revolutions, the resurgence of the AMP in relation to China’s 
contemporary modernization and re-nationalization of history is thus perhaps less anachronistic 
than might seem apparent. That is, the re-nationalization of history in China through a culturalist 
re-appropriation after the revolutionary moment – in which the revolution was national, to be 
sure, but also and importantly, part of a moment that (unsuccessfully, to be sure) attempted 
to demystify capitalism at a global level18 – is less difficult to apprehend. The remainder of this 
essay seeks to explain not only the Chinese recuperation of AMP, but to trace the symptomatic 
rise of the AMP as an explanatory schema in Euro-America at just the moment – from the 
nineteen sixties onwards – when capitalism both fell into one of its deepest crises and then 
seemed to pull itself out of that crisis to become the foundation of the globalized capitalism of 
our contemporary moment. This is linked to empire theory, both implicitly and explicitly, as AMP 
was clearly a theory of imperial formations in decline – Chinese, Ottoman, Incan, Russian, among 
others – before it became one element in a theory of national evolution; as intimated, it was also a 
theory that, in its twentieth-century internalization and re-articulation as method by Max Weber, 
was intimately linked to Weberian-inflected modernization theory. It is thus not surprising that 
the return today of what can be called transhistorical theories of empire and of modernization 
under the guise of both critical and celebratory ‘globalization’ theory tend to rely upon attenuated 
AMP categories for their explanatory power. The linkages between such theories and certain 
versions of postcolonial theory will be indicated at the end of the essay.
AMP, Modernization, and Capitalist Convergence
For years now, the post-war modernizationist conceit of global “convergence” has not only been 
disproved in practice, it appeared to have been discarded as theory. We can recall, briefly, the 
core claim of that conceit from the nineteen fifties through the nineteen seventies: stated in its 
strongest terms, modernization theory posited that the convergence of the undeveloped and de-
veloped nations was both desirable and possible through the correct deployment of national and 
bilateral economic, cultural, and social development policy. One primary arena through which 
such convergence was to be effected was in the realm of ‘values’, or, in what Max Weber and 
many after him strove to understand as the substructure that provided societies with whatever 
coherence they possessed. While numerous prescriptions for achieving such convergence were 
proffered, the manifest failures of the practices of modernization and the full-scale assault on the 
premises of the theory beginning in the nineteen seventies seemed to render the issue obsolete. 
Yet, ‘convergence’ has been reborn, in altered form, as ‘globalization theory’. This latter no longer 
calls for national development, but rather posits the fulfillment of a decentered global empire 
composed of semi-autonomous states in a regime of convergent commerce and free trade, into 
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which all are coerced or, more importantly, subsumed. As Justin Rosenberg has recently pointed 
out, in the process of positing such claims, globalization theorists have renaturalized precisely 
those fetishized categories that previous theorists – Marx and Weber, primarily – had worked 
to problematize: primary among them, “values” (Weber) and “value” (Marx) as cultural and eco-
nomic categories of analysis.19 As for subsumption, most philosophically-informed theories of 
globalization proceed from the assumption that real subsumption has been achieved globally. 
Taking a cue from Deleuze and Guatarri, they explicitly or implicitly rework Marx’s distinction 
between formal and real subsumption into settled historical fact. In particular, see Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri’s, Empire,20 whose argument is further clarified in an article by Antonio Negri 
and Danilo Zolo written in response to some of their critics.21
Even as ‘convergence’ theory was being subjected to assault by skeptics and critics, the path to its 
rebirth as globalization theory was augured from the left in the early nineteen seventies in the guise 
of critique. This articulation emerged out of the debacles of nineteen-sixties French and Italian 
radicalism, as well as from the challenges that decolonization and the failures of modernization in 
much of the world posed to Marxist theory and practice. Succinctly articulated by Jacques Camatte, 
a French Marxist, in his 1973 essay “Against Domestication”, this ostensibly critical theory posited 
that capitalism was now converging with its essential self.22 Unlike some Marxian theories of the 
time, such as Latin American dependency theory, which emphasized the underdevelopment and 
consequent local and global unevennesses reproduced by the capitalist world system, theories of 
the self-convergence of capital – of real subsumption, in short, where “values” and “value” seem 
to be conflated – while laying bare the capitalist claims of benefit to all, nevertheless began to take 
capitalism’s own self-definition and self-representation as their premise. 
Thus, the self-convergence of capitalism was understood as a geographically and temporally 
homogenizing mode of production, that, rather than being historicist – that is, diachronic or 
historically stagist – was globally synchronic. This formulation of temporal-spatial convergence 
links this type of critique to some versions of contemporary ‘empire’ and ‘globalization’ theory, 
a link revealed in a telling passage of Camatte’s essay, where he defines his nineteen seven-
ties moment as the moment of capitalism’s convergence with the AMP. He notes that in Marx’s 
theory of the AMP, revolts in the system effectively regenerated it, spawning the constant impe-
rial reconsolidation that accounts for the AMP’s durability and imperviousness to transition. In 
the light of non-transition, he notes that, what was being witnessed in the nineteen seventies 
was the convergence between the AMP – where classes could never become autonomous but 
rather were constantly reinscribed into the imperial order – and the capitalist mode of produc-
tion (CMP) – where classes were being absorbed, thus yielding the regeneration of capitalism 
and its imperviousness to transition.23 In a later essay (1976), Camatte further specified that the 
convergence of which he wrote was between the despotism of the CMP’s bourgeois democracy 
and that of the AMP’s generalized slavery.24 
In part an attempt to explain the resilience of capitalism through what had looked like its death throes, 
Camatte’s explanation of a convergence between the AMP and the CMP can be said to operate within 
what Simmel called, following Hegel, an eternal present. That is, it operates as a symptom of a par-
ticular historical situation understood to be a defining moment of the historical itself, much in the way 
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that Lukács explained Hegel’s concept of Geist in the nineteen thirties. According to Lukács, Geist was 
Hegel’s attempt to resolve an impossible historical contradiction in the twin contexts of the failure 
of the Napoleonic revolution and of what to Hegel appeared as the end of revolutionary history.25 
As both historical symptom, and then, as what Lutz Niethammer calls post-histoire prescription,26 
Hegel’s account of the cumulative perennial traces of time congealed in an eternal present allowed 
him to construct a totalizing history of an unfolding and a return, thus joining in identity philosophi-
cal immanentism and temporality as History, even while displacing Time unto the other. As Hegel 
summarized in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, “While we are thus concerned exclusively 
with the Idea of Spirit, and in the History of the World regard everything as only its manifestation, we 
have, in traversing the past ... only to do with what is present; ... Spirit is immortal; with it there is no 
past, no future, but an essential now.”27 It could be said this articulation is echoed, much more crudely, 
in what Slavoj Žižek recently called the Bush doctrine’s “paranoiac logic of total control over some 
future threat” in which “the loop between the present and the future is closed”.28 Given that current 
American neo-conservatism is linked, philosophically, to a Francis Fukuyama-type of post-histoire, 
itself a version of right-Hegelianism, this linkage is not arbitrarily invoked. 
In this light, we can note that, since the nineteen seventies, there has been an increase in theories 
– from the left and the right – that configure the older conceit of convergence into an eternal 
present of capital, now renamed either “globalization” or Empire (here, Negri and Hardt’s Em-
pire is paradigmatic).29 And, similarly to modernization theory, albeit in a different register, these 
theories of an eternal present of capital/empire present themselves as an opening to politics – in 
Hardt/Negri’s terms, a politics of the “multitude”; in Hegelian or Weberian terms, a politics of a 
class-specific civil society. Yet, as Camatte reminds us with his postulated AMP/CMP conver-
gence, these are really only a politics of systemic regeneration. For, as Peter Osborne has pointed 
out with regard to Hegelian temporality, “the constitutive role of the past in the speculative pre-
determination of the future ... might be seen as part of a politics of the present; at another level, 
it crowds out politics ... by prematurely imposing the perspective of a future which absolutizes 
existing relations to the past.”30 I would suggest that it is precisely in this absolutizing gesture that 
Camatte’s theory of capitalist convergence into general slavery can be linked to Hardt/Negri’s 
Empire, with their hypostasized concept of a global imperial formation and absorption of classes 
into an undifferentiated multitude. As I will explain in a moment, it is also precisely in this gesture 
that the AMP can be joined to national modernization programs.
First, however, this conjoining can perhaps most easily be seen in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guat-
tari’s articulation of the theory of contemporary capitalism as a regime of real subsumption. In 
the middle of their Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari have a sub-chapter entitled “The Barbarian 
Despotic Machine”. It begins: 
The founding of the despotic machine or the barbarian socius can be summarized in the fol-
lowing way: a new alliance and direct filiation. The despot challenges the lateral alliances and 
the extended filiations of the old community. He imposes a new alliance system and places 
himself in direct filiation with the deity: the people must follow … The despot is the paranoiac: 
there is no longer any reason to forego such a statement … provided one sees in paranoia a 
type of investment of a social formation.31
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Later in the section, Deleuze and Guattari clarify that their conceptualization of this “despotic 
machine” derives from Marx’s brief comments in the Grundrisse on the AMP. As they put it:
It remains to be said that, in order to understand the barbarian formation, it is necessary to 
relate it not to other formations in competition with it temporally and spiritually, … but to the 
savage primitive formation that it supplants by imposing its own rule of law, but that continues 
to haunt it. It is exactly in this way that Marx defines Asiatic production …32
In this haunting and haunted formation, the State appears “as the cause of the collective condi-
tions of appropriation,” where the socius “has ceased to be the earth” and “becomes the body of 
the despot”, a body identified as the “megamachine” of the State, or that “body without organs” 
that fully encodes all residents, precisely not territorially but through deterritorialization: that is, 
through a common subjection to an imperial inscription rather than through filiation to com-
munity and soil.33 Taking a cue from what Marx calls the real subsumption of labor under capi-
tal, which ostensibly follows upon the formal subsumption that marks capital’s early period,34 
Deleuze and Guatarri posit the AMP as the universalized real subjection of “residents” to the 
State as despot. This real subjection is then linked to the current (nineteen-seventies/nineteen- 
eighties) moment of deterritorialized capitalism by transposing the historical tension between 
formal and real subsumption – that is, their historically coextensive relationship that produces 
global unevenness – into the despotically subjected imperial global formation of the present. 
In short, then, for Deleuze and Guattari, the reduction of the sources of socio-political power to 
the body of the despot – as in classical AMP theory – and the real subsumption/subjection of 
“residents” into the universalized machine/regime yields a convergence of State and capital in a 
deterritorializing move towards despotism/general slavery. 
Clearly, Deleuze and Guattari, along with Negri and Hardt, and Camatte, among others, intend 
this theory of global capital as a critique rather than a celebration; it is also intended as a way to 
theorize new forms of subjectivity and new forms of resistance to this all-encompassing system. 
Yet, helpful as this theorization might be for an analysis of the production of subjectivities under 
capitalism as a mode of production rather than merely an economy, as Jason Read has recently 
argued,35 such a theorization nevertheless cannot account for the historical unevennesses pro-
duced in and by capitalism as a global formation. Indeed, they precisely erase the historicity of 
the coextensive relationship between formal and real subsumption that forms the core of the 
historical movement of capital globally.
Taking up the latter problem concurrently with the emergence of these versions of AMP/CMP 
convergence, other nineteen-sixties/nineteen-seventies theories posited the AMP not as a theory 
of convergent identity at the level of global despotism/empire of capital, but rather as a theory of 
colonial difference and historical unevenness. Pointing equally to the failures of modernization in 
theory and practice, while reintroducing specific historicities into the problem of global analysis, from 
the nineteen sixties onwards, and particularly with Africanist anthropologists in France (such as 
Claude Meillasoux36 and, differently, Samir Amin37), these quasi-recuperations of AMP, or of interest 
in pre- or non-capitalist modes of production more generally, led to an exploration of the historical 
relationship of expansive capitalism to local dependence on the domestic community for the supply 
of labor-power. That is, AMP and investigations into pre- or non-capitalist societies inspired theori-
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zations not of empire/despotism but of historical imperialism, with particular focus on community-
family relations as restructured sites for the reproduction of labor-power. These theories at one and 
the same time re-articulated AMP as a synchronic social formation within imperialist capitalism – as 
a coextensive relationship – while also distancing themselves from classical anthropology’s reliance 
upon kinship theory. Most important for our purposes here is how these anthropological revivals dif-
fer from the versions just mentioned: that is, in their understanding of local social relations as basic 
structuring elements through which capitalism simultaneously is constituted as a lived everyday 
experience of the historical, while becoming globalized as abstract historicity. Thus, rather than posit 
a universalized common mode of subjection or real subsumption in some global despotic “body 
without organs” in an eternal present of capital (or of pre-/non-capitalist kinship community), these 
theories enter the problematic through the intimate historical investigation of the reproduction of 
labor-power and primitive accumulation at many scales simultaneously.
The AMP and Nineteen-Eighties China
Another version of AMP recuperation is premised upon neither identity nor colonial difference, but 
rather upon national difference. This version, rather than collapsing historical imperialisms into ab-
stracted “empire” instead collapses “empire” into nation. Circling back, then, to the AMP in nineteen-
eighties China: the AMP came to be seen by many Chinese historians in the early and mid-nineteen 
eighties as a way of rescuing China from Maoist revolutionism and attendant historicist unilinearity, 
as well as a way to support reformist projects in the post-Mao period. For, the post-Mao rise 
of new social and political tasks and demands led to the exhuming of old historical and histo-
riographical issues, many of which long had been suppressed by a dogmatized Maoism. In this 
process, Chinese historians rediscovered in the AMP a national and thus a comparative imperial 
historical paradigm that could explain China’s “distorted” pre-modern and modern historical 
trajectory (where distortion is understood as the failure of China to develop capitalism out of a 
commercialized past, as well as the modern historical “wrong turn” or aberration of socialism 
itself). The rediscovery of conceiving China in extrinsic relation to the modern world – that is, as 
an a priori and ahistorical national unit and cultural unity – led historians to reopen the ques-
tion of China’s social formation in comparison to imperial formations considered to have faced 
similar conditions from the premise of analogous foundations – primarily Mughal India and the 
Ottoman Empire. This comparative impulse was engaged initially through the retrospective optic 
of comparing the economic and global fate of nations (India, Turkey) that emerged from modern 
imperialism. More recently, in both China and the United States, the comparative focus has been 
transformed by converting these national units into the incommensurable units of the historical 
empires from which they ostensibly emerged, thus yielding the deracinated perspective of com-
parative empires.38 The comparative object of choice in economic history recently has been not 
India but the Ottoman Empire. A series of conferences on the Qing and Ottoman Empires – one at 
New York University in 1999 and a follow-up in Istanbul in 2001 – has given rise to a small cottage 
industry in such comparative research. As such, by the late nineteen eighties, the AMP came to be 
incipiently articulated as both a nationalized theory of historical difference – multilinearity – and a 
comparative theory of (nationally-inflected) imperial formations. 
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It is in this dual form that AMP seemed to answer the needs of the modernizing Chinese 
present, even as the old AMP stagnation stigma was turned to positive account through the 
statist-culturalist claim to “five thousand years” of Chinese historical continuity. Operating as a 
marker of a posited Chinese national-culture difference as post-histoire modernization prescrip-
tion at the end of revolutionary history, and as a comparative imperial method to substantiate 
ostensibly commensurate historical trajectories globally, these recuperations by and large re-
cast the AMP in terms of a national historically continuous dialectic between the so-called Asiatic 
state and the rural order, a dialectic in which China was still deeply enmeshed.
The first of the major recuperative essays emanated from a reading of Italian Marxist Umberto 
Melotti’s 1972 work, Marx and the Third World. The author, political economist Wu Dakun, agreed 
with Melotti that the technological stimulation of productive forces was the only key to and relevant 
measure of development (as against Mao’s emphasis on transforming the relations of production) 
and that Soviet bureaucratism – named “semi-Asiatic” – and historically continuous Chinese 
statism – full-fledged “Asiatic” – were to blame for stifling these forces.39 Wu Dakun’s basic 
redefinition of the AMP emphasized, in a version of Karl Wittfogel’s long-despised caricature, 
the Oriental despotic nature of bureaucratism particular to China, the transformation of which 
would lead to the long-suppressed flourishing of rural production and the re-orientation of the 
primordial dialectic onto a new path. 
Not surprisingly, this rendition of Marxism as a theory of technologized modernization was soon to 
find its echo (conjuncturally not causally) in official policy, with the 1987 unveiling of Deng Xiaoping’s 
theory of the “primary stage of socialism”. This latter theory basically holds that Maoist over-
emphasis on transforming relations of production – that is, class struggle – was premature and 
had to be discarded for the prior task of the building of productive forces – that is, capitalist-
style modernization. One key component to the early practice of this “primary stage” socialism 
was precisely the retreat of the State from agricultural production, which temporarily boosted 
productivity and rural income. As numerous Chinese intellectuals have pointed out, however, 
these gains were at most temporary – lasting until 1986/87, when pressures for urban reforms 
vitiated the rural gains.40 In ideological terms, then, the choice was made in the Deng era to 
‘catch up’ with the West at the expense of a socialist agenda, thus recuperating in explicit form 
the modernizationist trope of the time-lag and reproducing the displacement of temporality so 
effectively suggested by Hegel and internalized as comparative method by Weber.
In a different vein, historian Ke Changji proclaimed that Maoist-inspired communes in fact 
represented the resurrection of primitive AMP communal society, long deemed to have hampered 
agrarian productivity and hindered the primitive accumulation of capital and thus the transition of 
China from a pre-capitalist to a capitalist order. In a definitive departure from Marxism, Ke identified 
“Asiatic” as an enduring rather than historically transcended economic category of rural communal 
production held in place through the “general slavery” imposed by the despotic state. As such, for 
Ke, the disbanding of communes and the retreat of the Asiatic state – here, the Communist state 
– from the rural order were required for the transformation of China’s enduring Asiatic pre-capitalist 
communal society – that is, Chinese socialist society – into a modernized one.41 Curiously, however, 
the stagnation in the gains obtained by ostensibly unblocking the AMP/socialist state’s dialectic of 
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state/agricultural production led not to a critique of capitalism and capitalist techniques, but to a 
further exploration and refinement of the theoretical purview of the AMP.
However, in the initial moments of the AMP’s resurrection, as these and many similar essays 
indicate, those most critical of Maoism in the early nineteen eighties were initially most forceful 
in arguing for the revival of the AMP as a legitimate but negative category of historical and con-
temporary analysis. Collapsing all of Chinese history into an eternal standstill of Asiatic statism, 
the AMP became an anti-Party proscription and prescription simultaneously. That is, these 
analyses combined the eternal standstill of a proscribed Asiatic statism with the eternal present 
of a prescribed – or inevitably destined – global capitalism. In this way, these analyses echo 
precisely those anti-Communist theories and sterile analyses of Chinese society long familiar 
to China scholars, fusing together the worst of Parsonian-inflected Weberianism with the most 
enduring of Cold War stereotypes (where Chinese Communists were deemed either completely 
alien to the supposed natural course of Chinese history, or, alternately, completely continuous 
with Oriental despots of old). Most startlingly, perhaps, these theories not only repudiated 
China’s socialist period, but they circumvented what had long been a central point in Chinese 
historical studies: the problem of nineteenth- and twentieth-century imperialism as an historical 
and historiographical challenge. Here, the tension produced by the ambiguity introduced into a 
purely ‘Chinese’ history by the incorporation of the Qing empire into global capitalism (nineteenth 
century) disappeared from theoretical view.
This moves directly, then, into the next strand of AMP recuperations, which pointed to the multilinear 
historical difference of China, both as genesis for the urgency of contemporary China’s necessary 
convergence with global capitalism, and as origin of world history in general. Unlike the nineteen-
sixties and seventies Africanist scholars mentioned above, who turned to everyday life and the 
social reproduction of labor-power in relation to both the persistence and restructuring of local 
social formations, the Chinese analyses of absolute difference are roughly similar in trajectory 
to Perry Anderson’s genetic approach to European history in his Lineages of the Absolutist State. 
That is, they attempt to articulate “uniqueness” as exceptionalism in Weberianized Marxist terms 
by drawing on a culturalist-statist conceit of origins – in Anderson’s case, Europe’s genesis in 
Roman classical antiquity and the Roman empire; in the Chinese case, Confucianism and the 
imperial state-form. Here, China’s exceptionalist past becomes a basis for a reconceptualization 
of Chinese history as the origin of all world history, thus, among other things, restoring the AMP 
to its position at the beginning of the global historicist sequence. Meanwhile, these theories also 
proclaim the cultural difference of China as adequate explanation not only for China’s past but 
also for the necessity of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. 
Such an approach not only obscures the restructurings of China’s modern social relations 
under capitalist imperialism, socialism, and post-Mao capitalism, it also forms the basis for 
a comparative historical method. This method concludes that, because all preceding imperial 
formations weakened and fell (Indian, Ottoman, etc.) while the Chinese one remained stable 
for thousands of years, the AMP can be seen as a positive descriptor of cultural strength, not 
a shameful deviation from normality. It is with this culturalist appropriation of AMP in the late 
nineteen eighties that the theory itself disappeared as an explicit point of reference to reappear 
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as the implicit cultural ascription that permits China to claim both continuity and transition in 
one breath. This rejoins China to some vulgarized version of the Hegelian dialectic by ostensibly 
substantiating the ideological real of our current global historical moment.
Conclusion: The AMP and Postcolonial Theory
The above account has necessarily reduced divergent theoretical concerns to some basic com-
mon denominators. What is significant about the general import of these new analyses is how 
they dovetail with certain strands of China studies in the United States, past and present, as 
well as with some concerns of postcolonial theory. Briefly, China studies in the US, as already 
indicated in the beginning of the essay, was never as influenced by the revolutionary paradigm; 
nevertheless, the repudiation of revolution in China – the very end of revolutionary history that 
inspired Hegel’s theorization of the eternal present and its re-emergence as the “end of history” in 
such theorists as Francis Fukuyama – has facilitated the rise in the US of particularistic theories 
of Chinese empire, particularly the Qing, as a critique of Eurocentric capitalism. Thus, in some 
mainstream US scholarship, China’s non-transition to capitalism is no longer seen as a “failure” 
but as a sign of China’s imperial strength and resilience. At the same time, the Manchu Qing are 
busily being equated with the Western imperialism powers – that is, they were all colonizers 
– thereby erasing differences between types of empires, modern and ancient, and facilitating 
the empire/nation conflations mentioned above. Meanwhile, reversing decades of emphasis 
on the rupture of imperialism, not only is the nineteenth- and twentieth-century imperialist 
moment now denigrated as unacceptable “impact of the West” theory and thus demoted to an 
epiphenomenal interlude in the continuous march of China’s history, but China’s commercialized 
non-capitalist past is held up as a form of alternative modernity – sometimes said to reach back 
as far as the Song Dynasty (twelfth century) – an alternative that is not only particularly Chinese 
but also, miraculously, particularly suited to the contemporary demands of globalization and 
convergence.42
Finally, then, the affinities of these analyses with postcolonial theory should be indicated. In 
one of its more recent incarnations, Gayatri Spivak has exhumed Deleuze and Guattari’s no-
tion of despotism and their re-articulation of the AMP as the perfect and perfectible despotic 
imperial/global mode of domination; she combines this with Samir Amin’s renaming of AMP as 
the “Tributary mode” to argue for the AMP as a “de-constructive lever” against totalizing theories 
of capitalism.43 While appearing to decouple AMP/CMP convergence, Spivak at the same time 
argues for the contemporary co-temporality of AMP/CMP, where the AMP functions to disprove 
Marxist projections of historical sublation (that is, the dialectical overcoming that leaves residues 
of the past). She writes: “The Asiatic Mode of Production … is the name and imaginary fleshing out 
of a difference in terms that are consonant with the development of capitalism and the resistance 
appropriate to it as ‘the same’.”44 In thus replacing one totalism for another, Spivak can at best 
be seen as replacing history with fantasy.
While she could be correct in her specification of the AMP as co-temporal with the CMP, this can 
only be in the sense that the AMP, just as feudalism and any other non- or pre-capitalist mode 
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of production or social formation, was only visible to Marx from the vantage of his present. That 
is, it was visible – to the extent it was extant at all – as one among other forms of pre- or non-
capitalist formation then being restructured by and unevenly subsumed into capitalism through 
imperialism and formal subsumption. Whether this co-temporality is, in Spivak’s sense, a way 
of what she calls “returning history” to these non-capitalist formations is a different question 
altogether. Indeed, Spivak may be working from a recognition of global crisis superficially similar 
to that of Marx’s, and this moment can best be understood as a crisis of capital over-accumula-
tion and consequent devalorization of labor – another moment of primitive accumulation – rather 
than merely, as in Spivak, a crisis in textual values.45 That is, as is well known, Marx set out to 
understand his moment of global crisis via the labor theory of value and a theory of primitive ac-
cumulation that could link capitalist to pre- or non-capitalist formations historically; Samir Amin 
developed this project, particularly with regard to global accumulation. The co-temporality that 
Marx or Amin assigns to AMP/CMP is thus a matter of an ongoing materialist historical process, 
a process that has perhaps changed in the contemporary moment, but is nonetheless quite 
material. That is, it is a crisis in value. With Spivak, however, this co-temporality is re-articulated 
through Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of “codes” and “coding”: that is, in terms of textual values. 
For Spivak, the utility of AMP as a concept thus becomes a textual utility: a way to restore a 
textually understood cultural/national difference to supposed AMP countries, primarily India. As 
she states: “the Asiatic Mode of Production in this new and globalized politics of reading makes 
visible the fault lines within the account of history as (European) modes of production.”46 
Ultimately, then, what we get with Spivak is a collapsing of history back into textualized “repre-
sentation”, as Neil Larsen has pointed in a different context.47 Thus, at the same time as she 
rejects labor as an ideological (i.e. historicist) notion48 that points to a trans-historical locus of 
value,49 she nevertheless also affirms the contemporary moment as a moment of devaluation that 
“provides the alibi for new imperialism”.50 Value provides this alibi, not because it is a universal 
relational category – of alienation, of commodification – but because the realization of textual 
values requires only species-life: that is, desire and/or nature. This returns ‘value’ to a Parsonian 
abstraction, as values, rather than a material productivity or effectivity. In is here that Spivak’s 
project dovetails with, while also departing from, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the AMP as 
the despotic specter haunting contemporary CMP. For Spivak, as for Deleuze and Guattari, the 
AMP is a “place of constant connections rather than an unbridged and unbridgeable gulf”;51 yet, 
for Spivak, it also appears as an alternative system of values, an unassimilable text or desire, 
a system or code which becomes the perfect agent for “decoding” capitalism.52 This version of 
co-temporality is assimilable to deconstructive arguments against the narrative linearity of capi-
talism, and thence mobilized for an argument about unassimilable historical difference, which 
ends up as a non-place and a pure heuristic convenience. In short, it ends up as a politics without 
a politics, founded upon a notion of a decentered globalized textuality infused with particularistic 
a priori values.
The affinity to the contemporary China scholarship referred to above resides in the shared 
revaluations of national/cultural difference as a strategy of global cultural inclusion and the es-
sential anti-historicity encoded in such a move. Curiously, then, we see the AMP recuperated not 
only as a handmaiden to a non-political, non-antagonistic politics of State-led modernization at 
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whatever social cost; but also as a form of global neoliberal or postcolonial multicultural moderni-
zation theory that reinforces rather than confronts empire in all its historical and contemporary 
manifestations. Finally, AMP becomes as an all-purpose theory of the Asian or imperial capitalist 
state as such. In the end, the AMP turns out to be precisely the ideologically real symptom of a 
global analytical turn that takes the State, not political economy, as the determinant of history 
and the arbiter of the present/future. We thus get Hegel’s transience and endurance re-combined 
into a reified ahistorical fantasy of global capitalism with no material limits.
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